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Abstract
Multidimensional signals like 2-D and 3-D images or videos are inherently sensitive signals which require
privacy-preserving solutions when processed in untrustworthy environments, but their efficient encrypted processing
is particularly challenging due to their structure, dimensionality and size. This work introduces a new cryptographic
hard problem denoted m-RLWE (multivariate Ring Learning with Errors) which generalizes RLWE, and proposes
several relinearization-based techniques to efficiently convert signals with different structures and dimensionalities.
The proposed hard problem and the developed techniques give support to lattice cryptosystems that enable encrypted
processing of multidimensional signals and efficient conversion between different structures. We show an example
cryptosystem and prove that it outperforms its RLWE counterpart in terms of security against basis-reduction
attacks, efficiency and cipher expansion for encrypted image processing, and we exemplify some of the proposed
transformation techniques in critical and ubiquitous block-based processing applications.
Index Terms
Secure Signal Processing, Lattice Cryptography, Homomorphic Cryptography, Multidimensional Signal Process-
ing, Unattended Secure Processing.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, we have witnessed an increasing interest in the research of schemes enabling operations withencrypted data. All these solutions are based on Secure Computation techniques, which aim at achieving
privacy-preserving solutions for secure processing of sensitive signals [1]. Most of these approaches are based
on homomorphic encryption, and rely on Paillier cryptosystem [2] as the basic block for performing encrypted
additions between ciphertexts and multiplications between a ciphertext and a cleartext. This approach can mainly
cope with encrypted linear transforms [3] with known (cleartext) coefficients.
Gentry’s seminal work [4] introduces a new family of cryptosystems enabling FHE (Fully Homomorphic Encryp-
tion) schemes that can perform both additions and multiplications in the encrypted domain, while being resilient
against quantum cryptanalysis. Despite the relevance of their theoretical contribution, current FHE schemes are not
entirely practical for real scenarios [5], so the most promising alternative relies on SHE (Somewhat Homomorphic
Encryption) schemes, which have been shown [6] to be able to efficiently work with encrypted signals and encrypted
transform coefficients. SHE operations are not limited to binary circuits but can be extended to arithmetic circuits
over Zt, with t ≥ 2, they are more efficient and less expansive. As a counterpart, while FHE schemes can perform
an unbounded number of encrypted operations (as binary circuits), SHE schemes can cope only with a limited
number of consecutive encrypted operations over the same ciphertext; nevertheless, in most real scenarios, the
maximum number of operations that have to be performed on the encrypted data can be previously known, so SHE
naturally fits.
The main drawback of FHE and SHE that drives most of the current research efforts in the field of Secure
Signal Processing [1] is their large cipher expansion. Several recent proposals are aimed at mitigating this effect,
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2by introducing packing and unpacking steps that allow to encrypt several messages in only one ciphertext [7];
hence, cipher expansion can be lowered, at the cost of increasing the computational complexity of the different
cryptographic primitives. Nevertheless, among the signal processing applications, those working with images or
higher dimensional signals are much more demanding in this sense, as the computational cost and cipher expansion
of typical SHE cryptosystems becomes unaffordable for them.
In order to address this problem, in this work we propose and analyze a new hard problem (initially intro-
duced in the conference paper [8]), denoted m-RLWE (multivariate Ring Learning with Errors) that better suits
multidimensional signals (e.g., 2-D and 3-D images, video, ...). By rooting the used SHE cryptosystems in this
hard problem, we show that we can achieve a reduction of both the computational cost and the cipher expansion
along with an increase in the security when working with multidimensional signals. This is so due to the more
compact and efficient representation of the signals that outperforms the direct use of packing and unpacking steps
in RLWE-based cryptosystems. Furthermore, we show that the use of m-RLWE is compatible with other methods,
so it can be combined with the previously mentioned packing techniques and CRT (Chinese Remainder Theorem)
[9], which can be leveraged for parallelizing cleartext operations under encryption [10]–[12]. We therefore achieve
our first goal of efficient and practical encrypted processing of multidimensional signals.
Besides its benefits for multidimensional signals, it must be noted that the m-RLWE problem yields further degrees
of freedom which can be leveraged to exploit additional structures (not necessarily related to the dimensions of the
data) in the data or operations. These structures can be recognized, for example, when processing several signals in
parallel or when applying block-wise operations. Therefore, we can achieve performance and security gains with
respect to RLWE in a variety of applications, especially comprising multi-scale approaches [13], [14]; these are
used, among others, in disciplines like geology, astrophysics, biology, imagery, medicine; being the latter one of
the most relevant due to its privacy constraints. Furthermore, m-RLWE also enables a new type of homomorphic
operations which are independent of the dimensions presented on both the signals and scenarios.
A. Post-Quantum Cryptography
As we have highlighted, Somewhat and Fully Homomorphic Cryptosystems appear as a promising solution
enabling both encrypted additions and multiplications, but this is not their only advantage. As a byproduct of being
based on hard problems over lattices, they can be proven secure against classical and quantum computers [15].
Since the introduction of Shor’s algorithm [16], it is known that some problems which were considered secure
against classical adversaries can be efficiently solved by means of a quantum computer [15]. Among these problems,
we can mention integer factorization and (elliptic-curve) discrete logarithm, which are the basis of the current most
widespread cryptosystems (RSA, Paillier or El Gamal). Lattice-based cryptography yields the most suited solution
to achieving both resilience against quantum attacks and, at the same time, operate on encrypted information.
The quantum-resistance property is another driver for our goal of providing more efficient schemes which can
deal with real problems and, additionally, can stand as future-proof against quantum computers.
B. Main Contributions
Here we summarize and briefly describe our contributions:
• We propose and study a hard problem called m-RLWE (which we introduced in [8]) (see Section III). We
give further insights on the structure and features of this problem, relating it with its RLWE counterpart and
exemplifying how a homomorphic cryptosystem can be based on this assumption (see Section IV).
• We present a toolset of multidimensional quantum-resistant secure operations enabled by the m-RLWE problem
(see Section IV), comprising: a) better encrypted packing of information, b) unattended encrypted divisions
without resorting to interactive protocols, and c) multi-scale approaches as wavelet transforms and pyramids.
• We analyze the use of pre- and post-processing to enable unattended packed and block-processing operations.
Additionally, NTTs (Number Theoretic Transforms) are proposed as a means to optimize the encrypted
operations (see Section V).
• We develop strategies to homorphically modify the structure of ciphertexts by incorporating some additional
information, and without the need of an interactive protocol with the secret key owner, hence enabling different
types of unattended secure operations (see Section VI).
• We evaluate and compare our scheme with previous solutions for several encrypted image processing appli-
cations (see Section VII).
3C. Notation and structure
We represent vectors and matrices by boldface lowercase and uppercase letters, respectively. Polynomials are
denoted with regular lowercase letters, omitting the polynomial variable (e.g., a instead of a(x)) whenever there is
no ambiguity. We indicate the variable of polynomial rings to avoid confusion between univariate and multivariate
rings, following a recursive definition of multivariate modular rings: Rq[x] = Zq[x]/(f(x)) denotes the polynomial
ring in the variable x modulo f(x) with coefficients belonging to Zq. Analogously, Rq[x, y] = (Rq[x])[y]/(f ′(y))
is the bivariate polynomial ring with coefficients belonging to Zq reduced modulo f(x) and f ′(y). In general,
Rq[x1, . . . , xm] (resp. R[x1, . . . , xm]) represents the multivariate polynomial ring with coefficients in Zq (resp. Z)
and the m modular functions fi(xi) with 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The polynomial a can also be denoted by a column vector
a whose components are formed by the corresponding polynomial coefficients. Finally, a · s is the scalar product
between the vectors a and s, whose components can belong to the integers or to a polynomial ring.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II revisits some basic concepts of homomorphic cryptosys-
tems and the underlying hard problems, together with an adapted definition of the multivariate RLWE problem;
Section III discusses the hard problems on which the multivariate RLWE problem bases its security. We also give
some insights on the relation between RLWE and m-RLWE formulations. Section IV introduces a set of possible
encrypted unattended applications for which m-RLWE brings about notable optimizations; Section V includes
the description of the main tools proposed in this work. Section VI proposes an optimization which enables to
homomorphically update the structure of the ciphertexts, and Section VII compares the performance and security
of our methods with respect to solutions based on RLWE and Paillier.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The state of the art in FHE is based on the Learning with Errors (LWE) [17] and Ring Learning with Errors
(RLWE) problems [18], which have proven security reductions from hard lattice problems. Both RLWE leveled
cryptosystems [10], which enable the homomorphic execution of a bounded-degree polynomial function, and scale-
invariant leveled cryptosystems based on RLWE produce the currently most efficient FHE systems [19]–[21].
Both RLWE and LWE have a similar formulation, that Brakerski et al. generalized to a common General Learning
with Errors (GLWE) problem [10]. We recall a slightly adapted informal definition of GLWE, as the basis for our
schemes introduced in the next sections:
Definition 1 (GLWE problem [10]): Given a security parameter λ, an integer dimension l = l(λ), two univariate
polynomial rings R[x] = Z[x]/(f(x)), Rq[x] = Zq[x]/(f(x)) with f(x) = xn + 1, q = q(λ) a prime integer,
n = n(λ) a power of two, and an error distribution χ[x] ∈ Rq[x] that generates small-norm random univariate
polynomials in Rq[x], GLWEl,f,q,χ relies upon the computational indistinguishability between pairs of samples
(ai, bi = ai · s + t · ei) and (ai, ui), where ai ← Rlq[x], ui ← Rq[x] are chosen uniformly at random, s ← χl[x]
and ei ← χ[x] are drawn from the error distribution, and t is an integer relatively prime to q.
When n = 1, GLWE becomes the standard LWEl,q,χ, and when l = 1 it reduces to RLWEq,f,χ. LWE-based
cryptosystems yield huge expansion factors and are computationally demanding, reason why RLWE was defined
as an algebraic version of LWE, trading subspace dimensionality for polynomial ring order (using an ideal ring),
and achieving huge efficiency improvements. As for the generic GLWE (n > 1 and l > 1), Brakerski et al. [10]
speculate that it is hard for n · l = Ω (λ log(q/B)), where B is a bound on the length of the elements output by χ[x].
It must be noted that despite the efficiency improvement, there are no known attacks in RLWE that get a substantial
advantage with respect to attacks to LWE.1 Hence, the currently most efficient homomorphic cryptosystems are
based on RLWE, particularly BGV [10], [22] and NTRU [23], together with their scale-invariant counterparts
FV [20] and YASHE [21]; depending on the requirements of the specific application, the optimal choice of the
used RLWE-based cryptosystem can be different as analyzed by Costache and Smart in [24].
We now introduce our extension of RLWE to the multivariate case, and build a set of tools to enable efficient
and unattended multidimensional encrypted processing.
1For a formal definition of the GLWE problem and proofs of security reductions for RLWE and LWE, we refer the reader to [10], [17],
[18].
4III. MULTIVARIATE RING LEARNING WITH ERRORS
In this section, we recall the definition of m-RLWE and sketch the proof for the hardness of the multivariate Ring
Learning with Errors problem. In [8], [25] we proposed a generalization of RLWE as a new problem called m-
RLWE (multivariate Ring Learning with Errors), providing an exemplary new cryptosystem based on it, especially
designed for encrypted image filtering. The m-RLWE hardness assumption is especially useful for working with
multidimensional signals; for simplicity of the exposition, we present cryptosystems extending Lauter’s cryptosystem
[26] (a simpler non-leveled version of BGV), but the same methodology can be applied to any other RLWE-based
cryptosystem as those previously cited. The formulation of the m-RLWE problem is the following:
Definition 2 (Multivariate RLWE (m-RLWE) problem [8], [25]): Given a multivariate polynomial ring Rq[x1, . . . , xm]
with fj(x) = x
nj
j + 1 for j = 1, . . . ,m and an error distribution χ[x1, . . . , xm] ∈ Rq[x1, . . . , xm] that generates
small-norm random multivariate polynomials in Rq[x1, . . . , xm], m-RLWE relies upon the computational indis-
tinguishability between samples (ai, bi = ai · s + t · ei) and (ai, ui), where ai, ui ← Rq[x1, . . . , xm] are chosen
uniformly at random from the ring Rq[x1, . . . , xm]; s, ei ← χ[x1, . . . , xm] are drawn from the error distribution,
and t is relatively prime to q.
We can state a worst-case to average-case reduction from the shortest vector problem (SVP) over ideal lattices
to the m-RLWE problem. For convenience, we particularize the reduction presented in [25] to the more specific
m-RLWE definition included in this manuscript.
Let λ be the security parameter and n = 2blog λe−1 with λ ∈ N. Consider also an upper bound B with
overwhelming probability over the length (in Euclidean norm) of the elements sampled from χ[x1, . . . , xm] (see
Lemma 1 from [22]). We can state the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 from [25] particularized to Definition 2): Let the rings R[x1, . . . , xm] (defined over
Z) and Rq[x1, . . . , xm] already introduced in Definition 2. Let q ≡ 1 mod 2 ·max {n1, . . . , nm} be a poly(n)-
bounded prime. Consider also the error distribution χ[x1, . . . , xm] with parameter r ≥ ω(
√
log n) and whose output
elements belong to R and are of length at most B with overwhelming probability. Then, there exists a polynomial-
time quantum reduction from O˜(nq/B · (n(l + 1)(log n(l + 1)))1/4)-approximate SVP over ideal lattices in R to
m-RLWE (Definition 2), given only l samples (ai, bi), which runs in time poly(n, q, l).
The proof for the security reduction of m-RLWE can be divided in two fundamental blocks:
• Hardness Search-LWE, which describes a quantum reduction from approximate SVP (Shortest Vector Problem)
on ideal lattices over the tensor product of an arbitrary number of ring of integers to the search version of
m-RLWE. The search version tries to recover the secret key s.
• Pseudorandomness of m-RLWE, which describes a reduction from the search version to the decision variant of
the problem (which is also more amenable for cryptographic applications). A simplified version of the decision
version of the m-RLWE problem is included in Definition 2 (for clarity on the exposition, it only considers
polynomial rings whose modular functions have the form f(x) = xn + 1, with n a power of two).
The full proof can be found in our pre-print [25]. In this work, we want to give some further insights about
the analogous structure between an m-RLWE sample and an RLWE sample. We also discuss the security relation
between both problems in terms of the indistinguishability assumption. For this purpose, we revisit and expand
the propositions introduced in [8], concerning the distributions of both RLWE and the presented m-RLWE. We
do this by first analyzing the distribution of the bivariate RLWE problem, that we later generalize by induction to
m-variate polynomial rings.
A. Bivariate RLWE (2-RLWE)
The bivariate version of RLWE can be described by substituting the polynomial ring by a bivariate one Rq[x, y] =
(Rq[x])[y]/(f
′(y)), such that the error distribution χ[x, y] generates also low-norm bivariate polynomials from
Rq[x, y]:
Definition 3 (Bivariate RLWE (2-RLWE) [8], [13]): Given a bivariate polynomial ring Rq[x, y] with f(x) =
xn1 + 1, f ′(y) = yn2 + 1 and an error distribution χ[x, y] ∈ Rq[x, y] that generates small-norm random bivariate
polynomials in Rq[x, y], 2-RLWE relies upon the computational indistinguishability between samples (ai, bi =
ai · s + t · ei) and (ai, ui), where ai, ui ← Rq[x, y] are chosen uniformly at random from the ring Rq[x, y],
s, ei ← χ[x, y] are drawn from the error distribution, and t is relatively prime to q.
5Informally, 2-RLWE is to GLWE [10] what RLWE is to LWE, as we are trading (for a second time) subspace
dimensionality for a higher polynomial ring degree, therefore increasing the security of regular RLWE and improving
on performance with respect to GLWE.
The dimensionality of the noise distribution is now n = n1 · n2, and we preserve most of the relevant properties
of the used ideals by considering the bivariate rings as the tensor product (as R-modules) of the ring of integers
of a cyclotomic field. Additionally, it can be seen that for the coefficient embedding the ideal lattices equivalent
to this product ring are generated by block negacyclic matrices of dimension n = n1 · n2. We now enunciate the
following proposition about the distribution of a 2-RLWE sample.
Proposition 1 (Prop. 1 in [8]): A 2-RLWE sample with nx = n and ny = l is indistinguishable from a sample
belonging to RLWE with nz = l · n.
For the proof of Prop. 1 we separately analyze the distribution of both a RLWE sample and a 2-RLWE sample.
In order to do this, we use the polyphase decomposition of the involved signals, with the particularity that due
to the cryptosystem requirements, which assume polynomials modulo 1 + zn, we must work with negacyclic
convolutions [27]. Next, the details of the proof of Prop. 1 are included.
1) RLWE sample: Let us consider a typical RLWE sample (a, b = a·s+e), where a, b ∈ Rq[z] with f(z) = zln+1
and e ← χ[z]. We can write the polynomial b(z) = ∑l−1k=0 zkbk(zl) as its decomposition according to its first l
polyphase components bk(z) =
∑n−1
m=0 b[lm+ k]z
m with k = 0, 1, . . . , l − 1, where
bk(z) = ek(z) +
∑
i+j=k
ai(z)sj(z) + z
∑
i+j=l+k
ai(z)sj(z), (1)
and ek(z) =
∑n−1
m=0 e[lm+k]z
m, ai(z) =
∑n−1
m=0 a[lm+ i] and sj(z) =
∑n−1
m=0 s[lm+j] where k, i, j = 0, . . . , l−1
are, respectively, the k-th, i-th and j-th polyphase components of the polyphase decomposition in l components of
e(z), a(z) and s(z), respectively.
Hence, each RLWE sample can be represented as a set of l equations with (n− 1)-degree polynomials. As the
convolutions are negacyclic, each one of the nl coefficients of the RLWE sample is equal to the summation of nl
different products of coefficients from a(z) and s(z), plus a noise sample from e(z). In those sums of products, the
combination of the different coefficients aisj present for each coefficient of b(z) is unique, so we have n2l2 different
combinations of products for all equations. Figure 1 graphically shows, in matrix form, the product combinations
for each polynomial coefficient.
Figure 1: Product combinations for the coefficients of a RLWE sample.
2) 2-RLWE sample: Consider now a 2-RLWE sample (a, b = a · s + e) with a, s ← Rq[x, y], e ← χ[x, y],
fx(x) = x
n + 1 and fy(y) = yl + 1.
If we denote the coefficients of yk for each signal with sk(x), bk(x), ek(x), sk(x), respectively, we have the
following expression for 0 ≤ k < l:
bk(x) = ek(x) +
∑
i+j=k
ai(x)sj(x)−
∑
i+j=n+k
ai(x)sj(x). (2)
6That is, we can see it as a polyphase decomposition in which the coefficients are shuffled in blocks and subtracted
prior to the extraction of each phase.
At this point, we can see the parallelism between Eqs. (1) and (2). In order to show that they are fully equivalent
expressions in terms of the sample distribution, let us build the 2-RLWE vectors a and s as the following block
composition of the ai and sj coefficients of the RLWE sample vectors:
a = (a0, a1, . . . , anl−1)1×nl =
(
a′0,a
′
1, . . . ,a
′
l−1
)
1×nl ,
sT = (s0, s1, . . . , snl−1)1×nl =
(
s′0
T
, s′1
T
, . . . , s′l−1
T
)
1×nl
,
where the involved a′i and s
′
i are respectively row and column vectors of length n. Using these vectors, Figure 2
depicts their product combinations in block matrix form, for the 2-RLWE sample.
Figure 2: Product combinations for the coefficients of a 2-RLWE sample.
We can interpret Eqs. (1) and (2) as equivalent ways of expressing the RLWE and 2-RLWE distributions,
respectively; the only difference between both lies in the coefficient ordering of the used s, e and a. The coefficients
of the 2-RLWE sample correspond to the summation of the different products of the coefficients of a and s, plus
a noise sample. As the signal blocks ai(x) and si(x) do not share any sample with the other blocks aj(x) and
sj(x) for j 6= i, and all the negacyclic convolutions are performed between different blocks, we can see that all
the product combinations are different. Thus, Eqs (1) and (2) are perfectly analogous up to coefficient ordering
and sign; as they have the same number of equations, both expressions are formed by the summation of different
coefficient products of a and s, and finally, they have n2l2 different combinations of products in total. This is
graphically shown in Figures 1 and 2.
Furthermore, as s and e have a symmetrical distribution and a is uniformly chosen, the distribution of both
samples is exactly the same.
7B. Multivariate RLWE (m-RLWE)
Resorting to the recursive definition of multivariate polynomial rings (see Section I-C), the Bivariate RLWE
problem can be seamlessly extended to multivariate polynomials (m-RLWE) with m > 2, by recursively applying
the proposed modification to the general GLWE problem. The formulation is perfectly analogous to the 2-RLWE
with rings R[x1, . . . , xm] and Rq[x1, . . . , xm], and error distribution χ[x1, . . . , xm] (see Definition 2).
Proposition 2 (Prop. 2 in [8]): An m-RLWE sample with ni and f(xi) = 1 + xnii for i = 1, . . . ,m is
indistinguishable from a RLWE sample with n =
∏
ni.
Whenever the cyclotomic polynomials in each variable xi have the form 1 + xnii (the degree is a power of two),
the same procedure sketched above for proving Prop. 1 can be applied to prove the equivalence of one sample from
m-RLWE (with n1, n2, . . . , nm) and one sample from (m−1)-RLWE distributions (with n1, n2, . . . , nm−2, nz), by
“folding” two variables of the former (nm−1, nm) onto one variable of the latter (nz). Therefore, Prop. 2 can be
proven by induction using the following procedure:
• First, we have shown the equivalence between one sample RLWE and one sample 2-RLWE (n = l1l2).
• Then, if we assume the equivalence between one sample (m − 1)-RLWE and one sample RLWE (with n =
n1n2 . . . nm−2nz), we have to prove the equivalence between one sample (m−1)-RLWE (with n1, n2, . . . , nm−2, nz)
and one sample m-RLWE (with n1, n2, . . . , nm−2, nx, ny, where nz = nxny). We only have to account for a
recursive application of the previous equations (1) and (2). For it, we simply consider that instead of operating
with coefficients belonging to the integers, all the involved coefficients are multivariate polynomials with m−2
variables and they also have the same modular functions for both the (m− 1)-RLWE and m-RLWE sample.
Analogously, for a graphical explanation, we can consider that the elements ai and sj in Figures 1 and 2 are
also multivariate polynomials with m− 2 variables or, equivalently, that the matrices for the aisj products in
m-RLWE are block matrices that can be recursively decomposed until reaching RLWE.
Thus, through a recursive repetition of the argument for the distribution indistinguishability between one RLWE
sample and one 2-RLWE sample (as stated above), Prop. 2 can be proven.
Regarding the security relation between RLWE and m-RLWE in terms of the computational cost for breaking
their respective indistinguishability assumptions, we can see that both problems have analogous security reductions
from hard problems over ideal lattices, but we cannot assert whether one of them is more computationally difficult
than the other or both are equivalent problems. In this sense, the better known attacks for lattice-base reduction
do not get noteworthy advantage when comparing ideal lattices and random lattices. Therefore, for our security
evaluation (see Section VII), we use the best available attacks for the underlying lattices of each hardness problem
(RLWE or m-RLWE problem).
Finally, even though the security tradeoffs between RLWE and m-RLWE are not conclusive, we want to remark
that in the case that both the RLWE and 2-RLWE problems considered in Proposition 1 were equivalent for more
than one sample, the inductive argument provided in this section for m-RLWE would apply, and the Proposition 2
would imply that m-RLWE and RLWE are also equivalent problems in terms of the computational cost for breaking
the indistinguishability assumption.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF m-RLWE FOR SECURE COMPUTATION
This section discusses how the m-RLWE problem can enable encrypting multidimensional information while
still preserving its structure. As we show, this can be achieved with only a small overhead on cipher expansion
with respect to the version in the clear, enabling additive and multiplicative homomorphisms, and reaching higher
levels of security when compared to the counterpart protocols using RLWE-based primitives, without reducing the
efficiency.
We briefly recall first the example cryptosystem presented in [8] and the use of m-RLWE for performing encrypted
multidimensional linear convolutions. Next, we introduce a set of practical scenarios where the m-RLWE problem
can produce effective solutions. These methods are not exclusive for multidimensional signals, so they can also be
of benefit to unidimensional signals. Among the proposed solutions, we find a better way to pack the information,
we enable encrypted divisions without an interactive protocol, and we implement encrypted versions of several
multi-scale algorithms (e.g., wavelet transforms and pyramids) which are widely used in both computer vision and
signal processing applications. We provide here a high level description for these solutions, and detail the proposed
underlying mechanisms in Section V.
8Table I: Proposed Cryptosystem: Parameters and Primitives
Parameters
Let Rt[x1, . . . , xm] be the cleartext ring and Rq [x1, . . . , xm] as ci-
phertext’s. The noise distribution χ[x1, . . . , xm] in Rq [x1, . . . , xm] takes
its coefficients from a spherically-symmetric truncated i.i.d Gaussian
N (0, σ2I). q is a prime q ≡ 1 mod 2max {n1, . . . , nm} (with n =∏
ni), and t < q is relatively prime to q.
Cryptographic Primitives
SH.KeyGen Process s, e ← χ[x1, . . . , xm], a1 ← Rq [x1, . . . , xm]
sk = s and pk = (a0 = −(a1s+ te), a1)
SH.Enc
Input pk = (a0, a1) and m← Rt[x1, . . . , xm]
Process u, f, g ← χ[x1, . . . , xm] and the fresh ciphertextis c = (c0, c1) = (a0u+ tg +m,a1u+ tf)
SH.Dec
Input sk and c = (c0, c1, . . . , cγ−1)
Process m =
((∑γ−1
i=0 cis
i
)
mod q
)
mod t
SH.Add
Input c0 = (c0, . . . , cβ−1) and c1 = (c′0, . . . , c
′
γ−1)
Process
cadd = (c0 + c
′
0, . . . , cmax (β,γ)−1 +
c′
max (β,γ)−1)
SH.Mult
Input c0 = (c0, . . . , cβ−1) and c1 = (c′0, . . . , c
′
γ−1)
Process
Using a symbolic variable v their product is(∑β−1
i=0 civ
i
)
·
(∑γ−1
i=0 c
′
iv
i
)
=
∑β+γ−2
i=0 c
′′
i v
i
A. An example of an m-RLWE based Cryptosystem
Any cryptosystem whose security is based on RLWE (e.g., [10], [20]–[23], [26]) could be extended to m-RLWE.
In [8], we extended Lauter et al.’s [26], due to its efficiency and security, as a basis to exemplify the main properties
of a semantically secure m-RLWE-based cryptosystem. Table I summarizes its parameters and primitives. There
are currently more efficient choices like FV [20] or BGV [10], but we prefer to abstract the peculiarities of the
high level cryptosystem functions and focus on the actual functionalities that our proposed mechanisms enable. Our
results can be straightforwardly extended to more efficient cryptosystems in case it is required.
The cryptosystem in Table I supports both additions (the smallest ciphertext is previously zero-padded) and
multiplications between ciphertexts which are composed by γ ≥ 2 ring elements from Rq[x1, . . . , xm]. This
encryption size increases with each multiplication (see Table I), and it can be brought back to the size of a
fresh cipher by means of a relinearization step, which involves using partial encryptions of the secret key (more
details can be found in [10], [26], and Section VI).
Security and Correctness: The security of the cryptosystem is based on the computational difficulty of
reducing the n-dimensional lattice (n =
∏
ni) generated by the secret key, and on the semantic security guaranteed
by the underlying m-RLWE problem (two encryptions of the same or different plaintexts cannot be distinguished).
As for correctness, q must be set such that enough “space” is guaranteed to avoid decryption errors produced
by wrap-arounds of the performed homomorphic operations. Due to the analogous (not isomorphic) structure of
m-RLWE with n =
∏
ni and n-degree RLWE (cf. Section III-B), bounds for the error norm [26] are preserved
when switching from RLWE to m-RLWE, by adjusting the increased dimensionality of the ring elements: for D
successive products between fresh ciphertexts and A sums, the needed q for correct decryption is lower-bounded
by
q ≥ 4(2tσ2√n1n2 . . . nm)D+1(2n1n2 . . . nm)D/2
√
A. (3)
Cryptographic Primitives: Although in this work we focus on primitives for homomorphic cryptography,
ideal lattices have also been used to develop algorithms for key exchange [28] and signatures [29]. Hence, we want
to remark that those primitives based on RLWE could be also extended to the m-RLWE problem.
B. Encrypted Multidimensional Linear Convolutions
Unlike RLWE-based cryptosystems, which lack support for multidimensional signals, the proposed cryptosys-
tem [8] introduces a natural way to work with multidimensional linear operations. Additionally, it achieves a more
compact representation of the data, as it can effectively encrypt one signal value per coefficient of the encryption
polynomial. We exemplify here the implementation of different representative encrypted processing operations like
9convolutions, correlations or filtering, showing the advantages of the proposed cryptosystem compared to its RLWE-
based counterpart. Unless otherwise stated, we always consider that all the used signals and filters are encrypted,
to fully conceal all the involved elements in an untrustworthy environment.
Convolutions, correlations and filtering can all be expressed as a linear convolution between two m-dimensional
signals X and H , namely Y [n1, . . . , nm] = X[n1, . . . , nm] ∗ H[n1, . . . , nm], which is equivalent to the ring
product of the signals represented as multivariate polynomials y(z1, . . . , zm) = x(z1, . . . , zm) · h(z1, . . . , zm).
Using the original RLWE-based scheme, an encrypted convolution would comprise encoding each dimension of the
two signals separately as elements of the univariate polynomial ring Rt[z], resulting in two (m − 1)-dimensional
elements Xn1,...,nm−1(z) and Hn1,...,nm−1(z) of R
m−1
t [z]. If Nni,y is the number of samples in dimension ni for the
signal y, the number of involved polynomial products is
∏m−1
i=1 Nni,xNni,h (i.e., N
2(m−1) if Nni,x = Nni,h = N ).
Contrarily, with our proposed cryptosystem the convolution can be done through a single polynomial product
of the encryptions, homomorphic to the polynomial product of the clear text. In particular, an encrypted image
convolution with the proposed cryptosystem would translate into the product of two bivariate polynomial encryptions.
Complex signals: m-RLWE also enables to naturally incorporate one extra variable to cope with complex
signals, represented in the polynomial ring Zt[w]/(w2 + 1), isomorphic to the complex integers ring, where the
variable w plays the role of the imaginary unit.
Edge Detection Algorithms: As an example of multidimensional convolutions, the Sobel operator is frequently
used in image processing and computer vision applications as part of edge detection algorithms. Resorting to the
homomorphic product property of the m-RLWE cryptosystem, we can easily convolve the Sobel kernel (any other
different type of kernel could be considered) with the encrypted image (even a 3D image).
Additionally, if the kernel operator is public, it can be in the clear when convolving it with the encrypted image,
hence being its homomorphic execution even more efficient.
C. Better Encrypted Packing
It can be seen that for practical image processing scenarios it is not so common to filter the whole image. In
fact, images are usually divided in different blocks and independent operations are applied to each block.
The approach introduced in [8] applied to this scenario would encrypt each block separately. However, this would
not benefit from the use of 2-RLWE (m-RLWE with bivariate polynomials) because we would not be encrypting
the whole image in only one ciphertext.
In order to preserve the same security (related to the dimension of the underlying bivariate lattices) as in [8],
we propose different mechanisms to pack the information by exploiting the block-structure of the operation and
restructuring the signals into “virtual” dimensions that can be leveraged by an m-RLWE encryption.
Instead of encrypting each block independently, we can consider one additional polynomial variable for repre-
senting the image like a video sequence where each frame corresponds to a different image block (see Figure 3).
Therefore, we can get an optimal packing of the information while preserving and exploiting the block structure
in the encrypted domain.
1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8 9
987654321
Figure 3: Indexing a set of blocks with 3-RLWE.
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The division of an image into blocks is not the unique additional dimension that we can consider and, in any
real application, we can also take into account the number of plaintext signals which we want to work with. One
would traditionally have to encrypt each signal in a different ciphertext, ending up with as many ciphertexts as
plaintext signals in the process. To this end, we can use m-RLWE as an optimization which enables packing several
signals in only one ciphertext, therefore using a smaller number of ciphertexts or even just one ciphertext, with the
corresponding increase in security (higher dimensionalities in the underlying lattices; see Section VII).
For this purpose, we only have to consider one additional polynomial variable that indexes the different messages
which are encrypted inside the ciphertext. For example, when dealing with simple images we would use 3-RLWE
(for 3D-images we would resort to 4-RLWE) in such a way that two polynomial variables would define the content
of each image, and the third variable would define the “index” of the chosen image (see Figure 3).
It is easy to find further scenarios where this strategy can be applied. For example, when considering the different
color layers of the images we can encrypt each layer in a different polynomial variable; hence having a total of 7
dimensions (R, G, B layers, horizontal and vertical spatial dimensions, the block structure of the images and the
number of images). This highlights the versatility of m-RLWE.
The difficulty of the implementation in the encrypted domain can vary depending on the operations performed
on each block or signal. For example, the computational cost will be smaller or higher depending on whether all
the operations are, respectively, the same or different for each block. All the details of the underlying primitives
are explained in Section V.
An example of Block Image Processing: A paradigmatic example of block processing in computer vision
can be found in the JPEG compression method, where one step requires to divide the image in blocks of 8 × 8
pixels and apply a DCT (Discrete Cosine Transform) to each block.
In [12], the authors describe how to efficiently apply a known linear transform to a signal which has been
previously encrypted by a RLWE-based cryptosystem. These techniques can be also applied to this block-wise
processing scenario, however the size of needed relinearization matrix would become 2n2dlogt qe coefficients
modulo q (considering a single layer image with n pixels).
Our proposed strategy encodes the block structure with an additional variable. This enables a reduction in the size
of the required relinearization matrix, resulting in 128ndlogt qe coefficients modulo q for an image with n pixels
(we would have to generate the vectors a, b which are composed of 64dlogt qe polynomials with n coefficients).
D. Unattended Encrypted Divisions and Homomorphic Modular Reductions
A recurrent problem in Secure Signal Processing is the cipher blow-up of the obtained results after several
encrypted operations in iterative processes, as a result of the accumulation of the multiplicative factor whenever
the encryptions are not “refreshed” after each iteration [30]. For mitigating the effect of this overflow we could
increase the available space for the encrypted messages (the modulo t in an m-RLWE cryptosystem; see Table I), or
consider a homomorphic integer division or quantization after each encrypted iteration (removing the accumulated
factor).
In the literature we can find several approaches for computing a secure integer division bab c, but all of them
resort to interactive protocols (e.g., [31]–[33]), and they commonly consider that the denominator b in the division
is public ( [33] keeps it private).
We briefly discuss how to tackle non-interactive encrypted quantizations by resorting to the flexibility of the
m-RLWE formulation, by including additional (i.e., virtual) polynomial variables. This enables the execution of
both real and integer divisions, at the cost of an increase on the cipher expansion.
First, we deal with unattended encrypted integer divisions (always considering that the denominator is public),
and then we address how to encode real numbers.
1) Integer Divisions: We can add one variable representing the binary encoding of the different messages (either
signal samples or pixels when dealing with images). This implies an increase on the cipher expansion as we encode
each value using one polynomial instead of only one coefficient. Thanks to this increase in the cipher expansion
(and with the use of binary masks), we enable encrypted integer divisions with a denominator power of 2.
For performing these integer divisions we can leverage to the tools from [12], where we show how to perform
shifts and element-wise products between two encrypted messages in an unattended way; the secret key owner
only has to generate several relinearization matrices which allow the server to recover the original structure of the
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ciphertexts after the different operations. Thus, if we work with the binary representation of the different values, we
only have to apply a mask which discards the bit(s) with the smallest significance, and afterwards, homomorphically
perform the corresponding binary shift.
The efficiency of such scheme is severely limited by the use of a binary decomposition, so we can look for a
tradeoff that enhances the performance: instead of encoding each value using its binary decomposition, we can use
a representation in any other base b > 2. This considerably reduces the cipher expansion while still being able to
perform a reduced set of integer divisions by powers of the new base.
Additionally, it is worth noting that the encryption does not hold information about the carries in each position
(when they have been previously undergone another homomorphic operations), so the performed divisions could
contain errors. To address this, we can adapt the homomorphic threshold function presented in [13] to homomor-
phically compute the existing carries in each position, therefore correcting the results.
2) Working with Real Numbers: The same additional variable used in the previous paragraphs can be used
for a fixed point representation of real numbers. For example, we can use the binary encoding of [34]. Hence,
the polynomial b0 + b1v + . . . + bN+vN+ − b−1vnv−1 − b−2vnv−2 − . . . − bN−vnv−N− that belongs to the ring
R2[v] = Z2[v]/v
nv + 1 encodes the real number bN+ . . . b1b0.b−1b−2 . . . b−N− in base two. After a product of two
polynomials encoding two real numbers, if the number of coefficients in the polynomial is big enough for storing
the new integer and decimal parts, we obtain a polynomial that encodes the desired result.
This encoding enables multiplications between real numbers and also real divisions in fixed-point. After an
encrypted division between real numbers, we can apply a mask for rounding the corresponding result, hence
achieving a better control on the increase of the encrypted values after the homomorphic operations. Analogously,
as in the case of integer divisions, we can consider a base b > 2 for the real fixed point representation.
E. Multi-Scale Approaches
Both signal processing and computer vision make extensive use of multi-scale representations to work with the
content of a signal or image [35]. In essence, they aim at finding describing structures of the content by means
of representing the information as a one-parameter family of smoothed signals which we call the scale-space
representation.
Among the most widespread multi-scale approaches, we can highlight pyramids (e.g., Gaussian and Laplacian
pyramids) and wavelet transforms (e.g., Gabor and Haar wavelets). In general, both cases require the use of a chain
of downsampling and filtering operations. The use of 2-RLWE to perform wavelet-based operations was introduced
in [13], where we exemplify how to homomorphically perform the denoising of an image in an unattended way.
By combining m-RLWE-based cryptosystems with the tools introduced in [12], which enable the computation of
changes on the sampling rate, we can efficiently perform multi-scale processing like wavelet filters and pyramids.
The set of possible applications [14] enabled by these techniques is really wide and covers some very diverse
applications. Among all of them, applications related to medical scenarios are more amenable for the presented
solutions, due to their intrinsic privacy constraints. In these scenarios, we can consider several applications dealing
with highly sensitive data, like Electrogardiograms - ECG, Electroencephalograms - EEG, Computer Tomography
scans, Magnetic Resonance Imaging - MRI, fMRI, among others.
V. ENCRYPTED TOOLSET BASED ON m-RLWE
As mentioned above, image processing commonly relies heavily on block-wise processing. This section explains
in detail how the block structure of these operations can be incorporated into m-RLWE ciphertexts to take advantage
of the multivariate structure and the m-RLWE formulation. It is worth noting that while we exemplify solutions for
image processing scenarios due to their typical block-wise operations, all the results are equally valid and applicable
for any scenario dealing with multidimensional signals.
A. Block Processing
First, we consider the case where the same processing is applied to each block. The straightforward approach
would be to encrypt each block separately and filter each encrypted block independently, effectively considering
every block as a different signal. However, we can leverage the m-RLWE structure and, instead of encrypting each
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block separately, we include one additional variable to the encrypted polynomials which assigns one block per
coefficient and enables processing different blocks in parallel without separating them (for the case of images that
are divided in several blocks, the equivalent would be to use 3-RLWE for coding the image as a video where each
frame is one of the different blocks). That is, incorporating an “index” variable to address the block structure, we
can work with only one ciphertext for all the blocks or signals.
If we apply under encryption a filter defined in those variables that represent the dimensions of the blocks, we
can effectively work with ciphertexts whose underlying lattice dimensionality is much higher than the ciphertexts
of the straightfoward approach, so the security is considerably increased. In addition, efficiency is not reduced, as
the expansion is not significantly increased, and one encrypted operation is equivalent to processing several blocks
in parallel. We address now the case in which each block has to be processed by a different filter.
1) New encryption and decryption primitives: When a different filter has to be applied to each block of the
multidimensional signal, it is not enough to have one additional variable for coding the pointer to the block structure.
This case would be analogous to having a set of independent multidimensional signals, and the corresponding filter
has to be applied to each of them. Hence, we need an efficient and secure packing of several independently operable
multidimensional signals into only one ciphertext.
To this end, we consider a pre- and post-processing inside the encryption and decryption primitives, respectively,
that we explain below, highlighting the differences that have to be accounted for with respect to the univariate
primitives of the cryptosystem presented in [8].
a) DFT/IDFT as pre-/post-processing: In order to obtain independent blocks, we apply a transform (DFT,
Discrete Fourier Transform) along the additional variable defined as the block index. The convolution theorem
states that the transform of a cyclic convolution between two signals in the temporal domain is equivalent to the
element-wise product of the transforms of the two original signals:
DFT (x[l]~ y[l]) = DFT (x[l]) ◦DFT (y[l])
This means that the operations applied along the variable l will be “component-wise” and independent for each
coefficient slot. Hence, we represent the m-dimensional signals by means of multivariate polynomials with m+ 1
variables
x(z1, . . . , zm, z) =
∑
l1,...,lm,l
x[l1, . . . , lm, l]z
l1
1 . . . z
lm
m z
l,
considering x(z, z) where z = (z1, . . . , zm) and l = (l1, . . . , lm); z is the variable that indexes the different blocks
of x, so we compute the DFT with respect to the coefficients (each coefficient represents an m-dimensional block)
encoded in the variable z (we consider the modular function 1 + zN , that is, N blocks). We have the following:
DFT (x[l, l]) =
N−1∑
l=0
x[l, l]e
−j2pikl
N .
If we apply the cyclic convolution (by means of one homomorphic product between ciphertexts) between X[l, k]
and H[l, k] with respect to the variable k, and afterwards the corresponding IDFT with respect to k, we are
effectively computing the block-wise linear convolution between the blocks that form x(z, z) and h(z, z) (provided
that the results of the linear convolutions do not overflow).
Therefore, if we apply the unidimensional DFT/IDFT across the index variable as pre-/post-processing, we can
perform the block-wise linear convolution between all the blocks that form both signals by means of just one
homomorphic convolution between X and H .
b) Circular Convolution inside the Cryptosystem: The correctness of the result of the linear convolution
only requires that there be enough coefficients to store it, but the convolution property of the DFT requires a cyclic
convolution. It must be noted that the cryptosystem only allows to perform multiplications between polynomials
modulo f(z) = 1 + zn for each variable, so we can only perform nega-cyclic convolutions homomorphically.
Several works (see for example [36]) show how to implement operations modulo 1 + zn by means of cyclic
convolutions. Here, we can apply the reverse process (presented in [37] and generalized in [12]), for enabling cyclic
convolutions using operations between polynomials modulo f(z) = 1 + zN .
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First, we have to do a pre-processing before encryption
x′[l, l] = x[l, l](−1) lN ,
h′[l, l] = h[l, l](−1) lN ,
for l = 0, . . . , N − 1.
Next, we have to do the post-processing for the resulting y′(z, z) = x′(z, z)h′(z, z) mod 1+zN after decryption
y[l, l] = y′[l, l](−1)−lN ,
for l = 0, . . . , N − 1, and we obtain a homomorphic cyclic convolution.
It is important to note that the presented pre- and post-processing steps require the use of complex numbers to
represent the complex roots of 1 and −1. As mentioned in Section IV-B, complex numbers can be accommodated
in the used cryptosystem by adding one additional variable with a modular function f(w) = 1+w2; this effectively
doubles the size of the lattices (increasing complexity but also security). The main drawback of this solution stems
from the need for quantizing the non-integer complex roots represented in fixed-point with sufficient precision; this
introduces rounding errors and implies an increase in the needed modulo for representing the signals, therefore
increasing also the cipher expansion. In order to remove this constraint and avoid rounding errors, we can replace
the DFT by its finite ring counterpart as explained in the next section.
B. Optimizations: Using the NTT to remove rounding errors
Instead of the complex-valued DFT, we resort to the DFT over finite rings, that is, the NTT (Number Theoretic
Transform) [12], [36]. Additionally, we use a finite N -th root of −1 in Zt for the pre- and post-processing of the
cyclic convolution. This allows us to avoid both the rounding problems and the need of doubling the size of the
used polynomials. This can only be applied for certain values of t and N .
The use of the NTT as a method both for efficiently performing encrypted operations and as an encrypted
operation inside an RLWE based cryptosystem was introduced by the authors in [12], and exemplified as a pre-
/post-processing in [38] for the univariate case. Hence, here we briefly discuss the particularities of the NTT when
applied to the multivariate case, and refer the reader to [12] for further details.
The existence conditions for an NTT with size N in Zt (with t =
∏K
i=1 t
mi
i where the ti are different prime
numbers) are the following:
• There exists an N -th root of unity α in Zt such that gcd(α, t) = gcd(N, t) = 1.
• gcd((αi − 1), t) = 1 for i = 1, . . . , N − 1.
The expressions for the calculation of the NTT and the INTT are the following:
X[l, k] =
N−1∑
l=0
x[l, l]αlk mod p,
for k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 and
x[l, l] = N−1
N−1∑
k=0
X[l, k]α−lk mod p,
for l = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1.
It is worth noting that our work focuses on showing the utility of the m-RLWE problem for producing efficient
and secure solutions that belong to the field of secure signal processing with multidimensional signals. Hence, pre-
and post-processing are regarded as a component of the solution, trading-off a slight increase (linear in the size of
the input plaintext vectors) in computational cost of the encryption and decryption steps for a global improvement
of the security and efficiency of the algorithms. In Section VII we analyze the impact of these pre- and post-
processing steps in the computational cost and we show that it is negligible compared with the cost of the (regular)
encryption/decryption primitives.
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In addition, when the case requires it, it is also possible to offload these pre- and post-processing operations to be
performed under encryption (without the intervention of the secret key owner) by applying the methods proposed
in [12] to the multivariate case, at the cost of an increase in the computational load at the evaluator.
This concludes the basic mechanisms for efficiently operating on m-RLWE encryptions. The next section
introduces methods to perform on-the-fly changes in the ciphertext structure in an unattended way, which enables
homomorphic updates on the available encrypted operations.
VI. UPDATABLE CIPHERTEXT STRUCTURE
The previous sections show how the possibility of adding some extra structure to the encrypted information
together with the use of some pre- and post-processing can enable a unattended encrypted processing in a wide set
of practical scenarios. However, once data are encrypted, m-RLWE imposes a specific fixed structure optimized for
a determined processing, and it is easy to imagine scenarios where the ability to change the underlying ciphertext
structure is very convenient (if a chain of processes has to be applied unattendedly).
The straightforward approach would be to send the ciphertext to the secret key owner to decrypt and reencrypt
under the new structure. This introduces several problems: a) the user can see some part of the required steps
for the execution of the algorithm implemented by the server, and b) this has an increase in the total response
time because of the delay caused by the communication between the server and the user. In order to address these
two problems, we propose a new mechanism which allows the third party to change the ciphertext structure in
an unattended way (without interaction with the secret key owner). To this end, we apply a modification of the
relinearization procedure [12].
A. Relinearization
The basic relinearization operation is intended to process encryptions after a homomorphic product. After
a product, the encryptions become a function of powers of the secret key s. The relinearization builds key
homomorphisms that relate s2 to s and is used to produce a 2-component fresh-like encryption from a three-
component one. For our purposes, we present a more generic version of the relinearization, which defines key
homomorphisms between two keys s and s′. Let us consider a ciphertext (c0, c1) with decryption circuit c0 + c1s.
If we apply the relinearization algorithm to (c0, c1) to express it as a function of the new key s′, we have:
crelin0 = c0 +
dlogT qe−1∑
i=0
c1,ibi
crelin1 =
dlogT qe−1∑
i=0
c1,iai
where the set of polynomials c1,i with i = 0, . . . , dlogT qe − 1 is the base-T decomposition of c1 for a given
0 < T < q.2 The different bi and ai come from the key homomorphism hi = (ai, bi = −(s′ai + Tei) + T is) with
i = 0, . . . , dlogT qe − 1; these homomorphisms can be seen as “pseudoencryptions” of the key s under s′. For the
sake of exposition, the decryption circuit of (c0, c1) can be represented in matrix notation as c0+C1s, where C1 is
a block skew circulant matrix of the polynomial c1 [12]. The matrix notation allows to see the decryption equation
as a sum of external products of restructured versions of the polynomial c1 times each of the coefficients of the key:
c0 +
∑n−1
j=0 c
(j)
1 sj where the different c
(j)
1 are polynomials whose coefficients are the elements of the j-th column
of the skew circulant matrix C1. In general, if we consider the concatenation of n key homomorphisms h
(j)
i with
i = 0, . . . , dlogT qe − 1 and j = 0, . . . , n− 1, where h(j)i has the coefficient sj “pseudo-encrypted” with the secret
key s′, we can obtain a new ciphertext (crelin0 , crelin1 ) without changing its content.
2We assume that T = t unless otherwise stated.
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B. Changing the polynomial structure by resorting to the relinearization process
The introduced representation of the decryption circuit (c0 +
∑n−1
j=0 c
(j)
1 sj) already sheds some light about the
approach we follow to change the polynomial structure through a relinearization operation: we simply encode the
different polynomials that form the h(j)i along with c0 and c
(j)
1 under the desired polynomial structure.
In order to incorporate this new structure, we first define a family of n! different reversible polynomial ring
mappings f (w)n,m : Rq[z1, . . . , zl]→ Rq[x1, . . . , xk] with w belonging to the set {1, . . . , n!} where n = (n1, . . . , nl),
m = (m1, . . . ,mk) and n =
∏l
i=1 ni =
∏k
i=1mi (the modular functions of the polynomial rings are fi(zi) = z
ni
i +1
with i = 1, . . . , l, and fj(xj) = x
mj
j + 1 with j = 1, . . . , k).
This mapping takes as input a polynomial element that belongs to the ring Rq[z1, . . . , zl] and produces as output
a polynomial element that belongs to the ring Rq[x1, . . . , xk] and whose coefficients are the same as the coefficients
of the polynomial input but rearranged in one of the n! different ways (w indicates the specific reordering used).
Now, we need a set of key homomorphisms h(j)i with j = 0, . . . , n− 1 where all the used polynomials belong
to the output polynomial ring, that is ai, ei ← Rq[x1, . . . , xk], and where instead of using s ∈ Rq[z1, . . . , zl] we
are “pseudo-encrypting” the coefficients sj with the secret key f
(w)
n,m(s) ∈ Rq[x1, . . . , xk].
Equipped with these tools, we perform a relinearization in which we consider the use of f (w)n,m(c0), f
(w)
n,m(c
(j)
1 )
for j = 0, . . . , n − 1 instead of c0 and c(j)1 . By doing this, we obtain a new ciphertext (crelin0 , crelin1 ) that is the
encryption of f (w)n,m(m) ∈ Rt[x1, . . . , xk] (the corresponding reordering of the original message m ∈ Rt[z1, . . . , zl])
with the secret key f (w)n,m(s) ∈ Rq[x1, . . . , xk] and where crelin0 , crelin1 ∈ Rq[x1, . . . , xk].
For example, if both c0 and c1 are polynomials that belong to Zq[z]/(1+zn) and we want to divide the encrypted
signal in blocks of length nx (e.g., to obtain an image whose rows are the different blocks), we consider the ring
(Zq[x, y]/(1 + xnx))/(1 + yny) with nxny = n; being nx and ny powers of 2. As we know which is the new
position of each coefficient of the encrypted message in the new multivariate structure, we apply the explained
method considering that the polynomials belong to the bivariate ring (Zq[x, y]/(1 + xnx))/(1 + yny).
The presented strategy can be applied to change the structure of the encrypted messages to all types of multivariate
polynomials depending on what we need.
Security considerations: The security of this process is guaranteed by the underlying m-RLWE problems
(see Section III) involved in the execution of the algorithm. Consider that we have a chain of structure changes
defined by a composition of L mappings f (w1)
n(1),n(2)
◦ f (w2)
n(2),n(3)
◦ . . . ◦ f (wL)
n(L),n(L+1)
, where each wi belongs to the
set {1, . . . , n!} with i = 1, . . . , L and each n(j) =
(
n
(j)
1 , . . . , n
(j)
kj
)
with j = 1, . . . , L + 1 is a vector composed
of kj natural numbers satisfying n =
∏k1
i=1 n
(1)
i =
∏k2
i=1 n
(2)
i = . . . =
∏kL+1
i=1 n
(L+1)
i . Then, the security of the
proposed algorithm is based on the hardness of the underlying multivariate RLWE problems defined over the
L+ 1 rings Rq[z
(j)
1 , . . . , z
(j)
kj
], where the different modular functions are defined as in the previous section, that is,
fkj (z
(j)
kj
) = (z
(j)
kj
)
n
(j)
kj + 1. Additionally, the security is also based on the circular security of the different involved
multivariate RLWE based cryptosystems (see Section IV), hence guaranteeing that releasing encryptions of the
secret key is secure.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we compare our implementation of the proposed primitives and tools with Paillier and RLWE-
based approaches in terms of efficiency (computational cost and runtime) and security. For the latter, we consider
distinguishing attacks, that are the best known attacks against lattice-based cryptosystems (i.e., attacks whose
objective is to break the indistinguishability assumption by means of basis reduction algorithms). The considered
security parameter is the root Hermite factor δ (the runtime of the attack is approximately propotional to e
K
log2 δ ),
which allows to estimate the bit security as [12], [26], [39]:
log2(δ) = (log2(c · q/s))2/(4n log2(q)), c ≈
√
ln(
1

)/pi (4)
tBKZ(δ) = log2 (TBKZ(δ)) =
1.8
log2 δ
− 110, (5)
where  is the attacker’s advantage.
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Table II: Size and performance comparison for encrypted image correlation
Lauter [26] (RLWE) 2-RLWE [8] 3-RLWE
n
(2N − 1)hRLWE (2N − 1)2h2−RLWE (2N − 1)2h3−RLWEI
number of ciphertexts
2NI 2I 2
ciphertexts products
N2I I 1
Due to space constraints, we do not explicitly tackle decoding attacks (whose objective is to obtain the secret
key of the cryptosystem), but we use values for n that achieve appropriate protection against the decoding attacks
described in [8], [26] and [39].
For the comparison, we have chosen an image processing scenario, and more specifically, parallel processing
of several images and block image processing, described in the next subsection. The rest of the section analyzes
the impact of our proposed schemes on encryption and decryption, and compares the complexity, runtimes and
achieved security with respect to previous approaches.
A. Evaluation for Encrypted Image Processing
We consider two privacy-aware ubiquitous scenarios of outsourced image processing: encrypted correlation
between I pairs of square images of size N ×N , and encrypted filtering among I pairs of square N ×N images
and filters of size F × F (where F < N ); the latter is equivalent to block image processing with I blocks of size
N ×N .
In all cases, we compare the security and efficiency of our proposed multivariate approaches against the univariate
and bivariate cryptosystems from [26] and [8]. The parameters for our cryptosystems are the following: s = 2
√
n⇒
σ = s/
√
2pi, t = 257 (8-bit images), A = 1 and D = 1 (see Section IV); for a fair comparison, we use a slack
variable h for tuning the value of δ [8] and comparing the cryptosystems in terms of equal efficiency or equal
security level. This slack variable represents the ratio between the total degree n =
∏
ni needed for achieving a
certain level of security, and the minimum length needed for storing the result in the different ciphered dimensions.
1) Encrypted correlation of a set of images: In order to fit the result when correlating images of size N ×N ,
the minimum degree of the used polynomials must be: n ≥ 2N − 1 for Lauter [26] (RLWE); ni ≥ 2N − 1 with
i = 1, 2 for [8] (2-RLWE), and ni ≥ 2N − 1, with i = 1, 2 and n3 = I for the proposed scheme (in this case,
3-RLWE). This is the minimum value for the degree, but in order to provide a fair comparison, we account for the
aforementioned slack variables h for fixing the same δ across all the three cases. The approximate relations for the
δ and the computational cost (in terms of number of polynomial products) in the 3 cryptosytems are the following:
Cost3−RLWE ≈I
h23−RLWE
h22−RLWE
Cost2−RLWE
≈4
(
I
h23−RLWE
h22−RLWE
)(
h22−RLWE
h2RLWE
)
CostRLWE
log2 δ3−RLWE ≈
h2−RLWE
h3−RLWEI
log2 δ2−RLWE
≈
(
hRLWE
h3−RLWE
)
log2 δRLWE
(2N − 1)I .
Table II reports the comparison in terms of encrypted image size, used polynomial degree and number of ciphertext
products for each cryptosystem as a function of the slack variables, while Figure 4 shows the computational cost
and achieved security with hRLWE = 16, h2−RLWE = 8 and I = 8, 16, 32, 64 varying N (size of the correlated
images).
It can be seen that for the same level of security (I = 8), our approach shows better performance (lower cost),
while for the same computational cost (I = 64) it is more secure; finally, our approach is both more secure and
efficient for intermediate values of I (I = 16, 32).
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Figure 4: Encrypted image correlation: Performance and security comparison
2) Encrypted filtering of a set of images: Our second use case deals with encrypted filtering of several N ×N
images with filters of size F × F . In this case, the minimum degree of the used polynomials is: n ≥ N + F − 1
for Lauter [26] (RLWE); ni ≥ N + F − 1, with i = 1, 2 for [8] (2-RLWE), and ni ≥ N + F − 1, with i = 1, 2
and n3 = I for the proposed scheme (in this case, 3-RLWE). As for the correlation scenario, we have to use slack
variables in the Lauter and [8] cryptosystems in order to guarantee a certain value of δ. Assuming F  N , we
can approximate the relations between security and computational cost for the three cryptosystems as
Cost3−RLWE ≈I
h23−RLWE
h22−RLWE
Cost2−RLWE
≈
(
I
h23−RLWE
h22−RLWE
)(
h22−RLWE
h2RLWE
)
N
F
CostRLWE
log2 δ3−RLWE ≈
h2−RLWE
h3−RLWEI
log2 δ2−RLWE
≈
(
hRLWE
h3−RLWE
)
log2 δRLWE
(N + F − 1)I
Table III reports the comparison in terms of encrypted image and filter size, polynomial degree and number
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of ciphertext products for each cryptosystem as a function of the slack variables, while Figures 5-7 compare
performance and security for several parameters. Specifically, Figure 5 shows the effect of varying N and fixed
F = 100, hRLWE = 64, h2−RLWE = 8, for a different number of block operations I = 8, 16, 32, 64. The
performance and security of our method improves with respect to the univariate and bivariate cases for a wide
range of N . Figure 6 varies only the number of images I , while fixing the rest of parameters to N = 241, F = 16,
hRLWE = 32, 64, and h2−RLWE = 8. This figure shows that our approach is more sensitive to increases in the
number of packed images or blocks I in terms of cost, but the counterpart is that the underlying security is also
considerably increased instead of constant. Finally, Figure 7 varies the ratio of filter size vs image size F/N while
fixing the size of lattices as N + F − 1 = 256, with hRLWE = 64, h2−RLWE = 8 and I = 8, 32. We can clearly
see that the unidimensional cryptosystem can become more efficient for very small filters, but at the expense of a
much smaller security than with 2-RLWE and 3-RLWE. For medium-sized filters, our approach becomes again the
most efficient and secure.
Table III: Size and performance comparison for encrypted image filtering
Lauter [26] (RLWE) 2-RLWE [8] 3-RLWE
n
(N + F − 1)hRLWE (N + F − 1)2h2−RLWE (N + F − 1)2h3−RLWEI
number of ciphertexts
(N + F )I 2I 2
ciphertexts products
NFI I 1
In summary, by packing several images into one ciphertext, we can achieve both a higher security and a higher
eficiency for a wide set of parameter ranges. Depending on the actual application, we can always get the best
efficiency by relying on a combination of a 3-RLWE and a 2-RLWE cryptosystem, that is, by searching for the
optimum number of images or blocks which can be packed in each ciphertext.
a) Trade-offs for the entropy of the secret key: There exists a trade-off in terms of the secret key generation
for resisting distinguishing attacks and birthday attacks [8]: the secret key must have a large enough variance to
resist a birthday attack (more key entropy), but small enough to be resilient against a distinguishing attack (lower
root Hermite factor). That is, if we consider that all the parameters are constant except for the variance of the
secret key, we have asymptotically qs ∝ s
2D+2
s = s
2D+1 (see Eq. (4)). So if we increase s, the entropy of the
secret key increases along with δ (the converse is also true: reducing the variance of s reduces the entropy and δ).
Nevertheless, the size of the key n =
∏m−1
i=0 ni has a higher impact on the root Hermite factor δ than the deviation
per component (σ = s/
√
2pi) (cf. Eq. (4)), and that is the reason why increasing m or ni in m-RLWE provides a
higher security against distinguishing attacks than the RLWE counterpart with the same key entropy, as the used
polynomials have more coefficients.3
If the key entropy from RLWE is already enough against birthday attacks, there is no need to increase it further
when transitioning to m-RLWE, so it is possible to reduce the variance of the Gaussian variables that generate the
m-RLWE secret key. This can be optimized for obtaining a secret key with the same entropy as for the previous
cryptosystems [8] and [26] while, at the same time, still reducing the value of δ (thus, improving the security
against distinguishing attacks).
B. Computational cost for the new encryption and decryption primitives
In the previous sections we compared the computational cost for encrypted linear convolutions (correlation and
filtering), for which such cost is proportional to a constant number of products between ring elements belonging
to Rq. These results are applicable when all blocks are processed identically (See Section V-A), as encryption
and decryption are unaffected. When the process is different for each block, we have proposed a modification for
encryption and decryption by introducing pre- and post-processing in them (see Section V-A1). We now analyze
the impact of such pre- and post-processing in terms of computational cost. Returning to the example of filtering
between I images with size N ×N and filters of size F × F , the cost for the product between polynomials from
our cryptosystem is
CostPoly.Prod ≈ (N + F − 1)4h2I2.
3A factor of O(I) more coefficients with respect to 2-RLWE, and O(IN) coefficients with respect to an RLWE solution
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Figure 5: Encrypted image filtering: Performance/security as a function of N (image size)
On the other hand, the cost of a pre- or post-processing operation would be (N2 +F 2)CostDFT (Ipoints) because
we have to perform N2 DFTs of size I for the images and F 2 DFTs of size I for the filters. If we use a fast
algorithm like the FFT for computing the polynomial products and the DFT, we will have a total cost of
Cost ≈
NPoly.Prod.CFFT (N + F − 1)2hI log2 ((N + F − 1)2hI)
+ (N2 + F 2)CFFT I log2 I,
where NPoly.Prod. is the number of polynomial products needed for performing the considered cryptographic
primitive (in this case, encryption or decryption), and CFFT is the linear constant of the used FFT algorithm.
Using a slack value of h = 1, we can obtain the ratio between the cost for the pre- or post-processing and the
respective encryption/decryption primitive (with no pre-/post-processing):
RatioCost ≈
(N2 + F 2)CFFT I log2 I
NPoly.Prod.CFFT (N + F − 1)2I log2((N + F − 1)2I)
,
where RatioCost achieves its highest value when F = 1.
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(a) hRLWE = 32
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Figure 6: Encrypted image filtering: Performance/security as a function of I (# of blocks)
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Figure 7: Encrypted image filtering varying the ratio F/N
Now, let us express the asymptotic RatioCost when F = 1 and N →∞:
lim
N→∞
RatioCost = lim
N→∞
(N2 + 1)CFFT I log2 I
NPoly.Prod.CFFTN2I log2(N
2I)
= lim
N→∞
(1 + 1N2 )CFFT I log2 I
NPoly.Prod.CFFT I log2(N
2I)
=0.
Therefore, when increasing the size of the images, the additional cost for the primitives becomes negligible.
Additionally, it is also interesting to calculate the maximum increase in computational cost that the use of pre- and
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post-processing can incur on. With this aim, we study the case when I →∞ and F = 1:
lim
I→∞
RatioCost =
= lim
I→∞
(N2 + 1)CFFT I log2 I
NPoly.Prod.CFFTN2I log2(N
2I)
= lim
I→∞
N2 + 1
NPoly.Prod.N2
log2 IN
2
log2 I
= lim
I→∞
N2 + 1
NPoly.Prod.N2(
log2N
2
log2 I
+ 1)
=
N2 + 1
NPoly.Prod.N2
,
that is approximately 1NPoly.Prod. when N is big enough.
Hence, the worst-case computational cost of the modified encryption and decryption primitives with respect
to the original one is CostOrig.Primitive · (1 + 1NPoly.Prod. ). The encryption conveys 2 polynomial products, so
3
2CostEncryption (CostEncryption represents the computational cost of the original encryption), and for the decryption
it depends on both the number of polynomial elements comprising the ciphertexts and the computation of the
powers of the secret key. Assuming that the powers of the secret key have been precomputed, we would have
CostDecryption · (1 + 1Num. of Elements−1) = CostDecryption
Num. of Elements
Num. of Elements−1 (CostDecryption represents the
computational cost of the original decryption).
Summarizing, we can see that the cost increase due to the use of the pre and post-processing is very small, and
in fact, it becomes negligible for practical cases.
C. Implementation and execution times
We have implemented both Lauter RLWE-based cryptosystem and our m-RLWE extension in C using the GMP
6.0.04 and NFLlib [40] libraries. Table IV compares the obtained encrypted filtering runtimes with a square filter
of side F = 11 on an Intel Xeon E5-2620 processor running Linux; we consider several (I) packed images of size
N×N in the same ciphertext with: a) the traditional Paillier (with a clear text filter), b) a RLWE cryptosystem [26],
c) a 2-RLWE cryptosystem [8], and d) its 3-RLWE counterpart.
The reported encryption times comprise the encryption of all involved signals, both images and filters, except for
Paillier, for which the filters are not encrypted. We do not include relinearization steps after each multiplication,
and instead take into account the more demanding decryption of the extended encryptions (ciphertexts grow after
each multiplication if relinearization is not applied).
Table V compares the encrypted image filtering performance considering both 3D volumetric images (as the ones
used in MRI applications) of size Nx×Ny×Nz (with Nz = 12 for all the considered images), and a 3D Gaussian
smoothing kernel (which is not encrypted) of length F = 5 in each dimension with: a) traditional Paillier, b) a
RLWE cryptosystem [26], c) a 2-RLWE cryptosystem [8], and d) its 3-RLWE counterpart.
Tables IV and V show that the runtimes of lattice-based cryptosystems clearly outperform those provided by
Paillier; both 3-RLWE and 2-RLWE schemes are the fastest and the most compact in terms of cipher expansion.
Even though the 2-RLWE cryptosystem is slightly faster and has less cipher expansion than the 3-RLWE counterpart,
the security provided by the latter is much higher, so incorporating “virtual” dimensions contributes to increasing
the security without significantly impacting efficiency.
Table VI compares the homomorphic computation of the 8× 8 block-DCT (the DCT transform matrix is known
and, hence, public) for images of size N ×N , with: a) traditional Paillier, b) a RLWE cryptosystem [26], and c) a
2-RLWE cryptosystem. The corresponding sizes of the relinearization matrices are also reported. Table VI shows
that even though all lattice-based schemes outperform the use of Paillier for encryption/decryption, the block DCT
transforms cannot be efficiently computed with an RLWE-based solution due to the huge size of the relinearization
matrix. By considering a “virtual” dimension with 2-RLWE, this size is reduced in several orders of magnitude,
considerably improving the runtimes for the block DCT transforms.
4“GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library,” www.gmplib.org.
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Table IV: Encrypted filtering performance (D = 1, t = 12289, s =
√
2pi)
(I,N) (4, 246) (2, 502) (4, 502)
3-RLWE cryptosystem
n 262144 524288 1048576
dlog2(q)e 59 61 62
Enc. images size (bits) 6.15·107 1.26·108 2.59·108
δ 1.000039 1.000020 1.000010
Bit security 31968 62451 121978
Encrypt. time (ms) 67 137 300
Decrypt. time (ms) 16 33 87
Conv. time (ms) 7 14 29
2-RLWE cryptosystem
n 65536 262144 262144
dlog2(q)e 56 59 59
Enc. images size (bits) 5.84·107 1.23·108 2.46·108
δ 1.00015 1.000039 1.000039
Bit security 8340 31968 31968
Encrypt. time (ms) 61 128 257
Decrypt. time (ms) 13 29 57
Conv. time (ms) 6 14 27
RLWE cryptosystem
n 2048 (h = 8) 2048 (h = 4) 2048 (h = 4)
dlog2(q)e 49 49 49
Enc. images size (bits) 2.03·108 2.02·108 4.05·108
δ 1.0041 1.0041 1.0041
Bit security 195 195 195
Encrypt. time (ms) 236 235 470
Decrypt. time (ms) 81 81 162
Conv. time (ms) 639 652 1305
Paillier cryptosystem (with 2048 bit modulus, 112 bits of security)
Enc. images size (bits) 9.92 · 108 2.06 · 109 4.13 · 109
Encrypt. time (s) 3.36 · 103 6.99 · 103 13.98 · 103
Decrypt. time (s) 3.61 · 103 7.23 · 103 14.46 · 103
Conv. time (s) 2.16 · 103 4.51 · 103 9.01 · 103
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a novel hard problem, denoted Multivariate Ring Learning with Errors (m-RLWE), that enables
efficient encrypted processing of images and multidimensional signals (3-D images, video,...). Cryptosystems based
on this problem can flexibly fit the input signal structure, therefore producing an extremely efficient encryption with
very low processing overhead and cipher expansion. We have also produced novel techniques to deal with non-
interactive transformations between different structures, enabling for the first time block-based multidimensional
encrypted signal processing in a non-interactive way. This is especially relevant in privacy-aware scenarios like
outsourced medical imaging (ECG, EEG, CT scans, MRI,...), where the proposed solutions enable unprecedented
encrypted performance and security levels. The proposed problem, encryption mechanisms and transformation
techniques open up a wide range of novel encrypted processing applications supporting secure unattended outsourced
processing of signals of almost any kind.
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